Torts (1959-1967) by Woodbridge, Dudley Warner
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Virginia Bar Notes 1948–1962: Dudley W. Woodbridge (Acting Dean1948-1950)
1968
Torts (1959-1967)
Dudley Warner Woodbridge
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/vabarnotes
Repository Citation
Woodbridge, Dudley Warner, "Torts (1959-1967)" (1968). Virginia Bar Notes. Paper 16.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/vabarnotes/16
• 
oYfs 
059 
7. F1athead, an employee of the Grubb Coal Co., was operating a company truck between 
Madison and Sperryville. While traveling east on the two-lane highway he stopped his 
vehicle to converse with Rumbum, a local farmer whom he saw walking beside the road. 
When he stopped his vehicle, he pulled only partially off of the traveled ' porti on of 
the highway, even though there was ample space for him to have pulled completely off 
of the road. While his vehicle was in this position it was sideswiped by a Stutz 
Bearcat driven by Deadbeat, who was also traveling east. After striking the truck, 
the Stutz Bearcat ricocheted acrosL the highway into the west-bound lane where it 
collided head-on with a west-bound motorcycle operated by Innocent. The evidence 
indicated that Deadbeat had had an unobscured view of the parked truck for almost 
600 feet as he approached it down the highway. The day was clear and the road was 
dry. Innocent has instituted an action against Deadbeat and the Grubb Coal Co. The 
company consults you as to its liability. What should you advise? · 
I 
(TORTS) The Coal Company is not liable. wnere a second tort-feasor should be aware 
of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original 
tort-feasor and thereafter by an independent act of negligence brings about an 
accident, the condition created by the original tort-feasor becomes mere~y a 'circum-
stance of the accident and is not a proximate cause thereof. See 173 Va.448, 3 s.E. 
(2d) 397 on p.l021 of Torts in these Notes • 
. + 6'1 
B. Hlmfat, a Tidewater rancher, was the proud owner of a spotted hog, Sidney. One 
moonless night Sidney disappeared.. Ho.mfat immediately suspected Cornpone, a local 
tramp with a reputation for barnyard thievery. He sent his nephew, Bullhead, to 
search for Cornpone and Sidney while he called the Sheriff. While hunting for Corn-
pone, Bullhead was informed by Blab that Seedy, another tramp, had been seen carry-
ing a spotted hog. Bullhead went immediately to the railroad yard and there found 
Seedy with a hog that fit Sidney's description. Although Bullhead had never seen 
Sidney he correctly surmised that he had found the thief and he immediately hustled 
the protesting Seedy off to jail. Meanwhile back at the ranch Hamfat had contacted 
Fosdick, a relentless deputy sheriff. Informed of Hamfat's suspicions concerning the 
loss of his valuable hog, Fosdi ck went to Cornpone's shack where he surprised Corn-
pone in the midst of a roast pork dinner. Cornpone denied any knowledge of the theft 
and refused to accompany Fosdick since the latter had no warrant for his arrest. 
Fosdick then seized the reluctant Cornpone by the arm and escorted him to jail. 
There he discovered that Seedy had already confessed to the act. 
Prior to the filing of fo~mal charges, it became necessary to determine the mone-
tary value of Sidney. Xuch to Hamfat's dismay, it was determined that Sidney was 
worth only $45 on the current market. The case was disposed of accordingly, Seedy 
entering a plea of guilty. 
~~, .. 
(a) Cornpone c~nsulte you in regard to his chances of success in an action for 
illegal arrest against Fosdick. How would you advise him? 
(b) Seedy consults you in regard to his chances for success in an action for 
damages for illegal arrest against Bullhead. How would you advise him? 
(TOHTS) Under the Code(V#l8-165) stealing a hog is a felony regardless of the value 
thereof. Since a felony actually had been committed and since Bullhead reasonably 
believed that Seedy had committed it, the arrest of Seedy by Bullhead, a private 
person not an officer, was privileged. 
As to Fosdick who was an officer of the law, if he reasonably believed that a 
the facta of this case can be argued either way}. 
felony had been committed and that Cornpone was the guilty party his arrest of the ~ 
latter · was also privileged.(Whether or not such a belief was a reasonable one under 
9.Dim~ ~tled out of his driveway onto Peach~ree Street without stopping and with-
out looking in either direction. After his vehicle had reached the street he noted a 
vehicle approaching at a very high rate of speed from his left. Dimwit turned his 
wheels sharply to the right and accelerated his car as much as possible in hopes of 
outdistancing the approaching car before it struck him. In so doing he lost control 
of his own car and swerved across into the opposite lane~ of traffic where his vehicle 
struck that of Indignant. In an action by Indignant against Dimwit to recover 
damages, Dimwit asks for an instruction on sudden emergency. 
Should this instruction be granted? 
(TORTS) The instruction should not be given. One who is himself to blame for the 
sudden emergency cannot invoke the doctrine for he was negligent in getting into 
such a position in the first place. See 192 S.E.800 on p.l003 of Torts in these Notes 
10. B~m~~ the operator of a motion picture theatre •. Doom was the owner of an 
adjacent building. A fire, originating in Bloom's theatre burned down both the 
theatre and the adjacent building belonging to Doom. The fire was so severe and the 
damages so extensive that there wa~ no evidence as to the cause of the fire. 
May the doctrine of res ips~ loquitur be invoked by Doom in an action against 
Bloom to recover damages-caused by the fire? 
(TORTS) No. 'rhe fire may or may not have been caused by the negligence of Bloom. It 
may have been due to an act of God, spontaneous combustion,the act of a pyromaniac, 
a carelessly thrown cigarette, defective wiring,etc,etc. The doctrine of ~ ipsa 
lotuitur only applies to those situations. in which accidents rarely occur unless 
ae endant has been negligent. See 189 Va.948 on P• lOlS of Torts in these notes. 
]) ~ 1 
B. Zedd Rux, the o~~rly protective father of Doris Rux, specifically instructed her 
fiance, Boris Tanner, to have Doria home by 9:00 o'clock p.m. As the deadline 
approached, and the couple had not returned, Rux became greatly exercised and took 
down his shotgun and stationed himself on the front porch. At 9:1Sp.m. the couple 
drove up to the house in Tanner's oar, and Rux immediately ran down to the car and 
began to shout indignities to Tanner and to brandish the gun menacingly. Tanner, 
afraid for his safety, quickly discharged Doris and drove off rapidly in the oar. 
As he did so, Mrs. Zedd Rux shouted excitedly from the porch, 11Shoot him Zeddltt; 
whereupon Rux fired a shot at the disappearing car, which damaged its re~r end. 
In an action for property damages against Zedd Rux, judgment was entered in favor 
of Tanner for $100, the cost of repairing the oar, but ·execution thereon was return-
ed tlno effects". Tanner then learned that Mrs. Rux owned prc:>perty in her own name, 
and he instituted an action by motion for judgment against her for damages for the 
same occurrence, alleging the above facts. 
Mrs.Rux filed(l)a special plea ·alleging that the judgment against Zedd constituted 
a bar to the action against her; and (2) a demurrer to the motion for judgment. 
How should the court rule:(l)on the special plea:(2) on the demurrer? 
(TORTS)(l) The court should rule that the special plea is invalid. Mr. and Mrs.Rux 
are joint tortfeasors in that Mrs. Rux was present urging and abetting her husband 
in the tort. A judgment against one joint tortfeasor is not a bar to an action 
against the other joint tortfeasors unless it has been satisfied by express statu-
tory provision(V#B-368).(2) The demurrer should likewise be overruled because one 
present and encouraging the commission of a tort is just as liable as the person 
who commits the requested wrong. See Prosser on Torts(2nd Ed)p.234. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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7) J" 'f . 
9. Joe Johnson, a student in college in Charlottesville had returned to his home 
in Norfolk for a short vacation and decided to seek div~rsion at Virginia Beach. 
He invited his fr~end Sam Stiles, an insurance adjuster, to accompany him in 
Johnso~'s car. St1les pleaded that he was entirely too busy to take the time off 
fro~ h~s work,,bu~ ~hat he had promised a visit to his elderly grandmother, who 
res~ded near V1rg~n1a Beach, and that if Johnson would stop briefly at the grand-
mother's home, he.would then go on to Virginia Beach with Johnson. Johnson then 
bought SO ·cents worth of gasoline at a filling station and Stiles offered to pay 
25 cents ot it, which offer Johnson aqcepted. 
At a eurva on the open highway near Virginia Beach, in a 45-mile per hour speed 
zone, Johnson was driving at a ~peed of so miles per hour, when his car struck an 
oily spot which was not visible to him. The car skidded off the highway, struck e 
tree, and Stiles was injured. . 
Stiles asks your advice as to whether the above facts give him a cause of act~on 
against Johnson. How would you advise him? . . 
(TORTS) No, for two reasons. In the first place Johnson's negl~gence in go~ng a~ a 
ra t e of five miles above the speed limit was not the proximate cause of the. acc1dent. 
but the slick oily spot for which he was not to blame. In the next place St~les was 
a gratuitous guest. Paying 25 cents on the gasoline and stopping on the way to see 
Stiles' grandmother were mere social amenities rather than a bargained for contract. 
The only duty owed by Johnson was not to be grossly negligent, and he did not 
violate that duty. See Headnote 2 to 194 Va.S41. 
--~D . 
9!Miss Jarvis, an elderly spinster of excellent moral character, took a prominent 
part in civic affairs and led a crusade against a rather wide-open night spot. One 
of the performers, commonly known as 11The Complete Stripper," took offense at this 
activity, and at one of the perfon,~ances said: "Old Jarvis is just jealous, and if 
she had anything worth seeing she might try to show it, but who wants to look at 
her.n This statement was so loudly applauded by the audience that the proprietor 
printed it in the programs which were distributed at subsequent performances. 
Miss Jarvis consults you as to any right of action she may have against Stripper 
or the proprietor, telling you that of course she hasn't suffered any pecuniary loss 
but she wants these people to be made to pay for their acts. 
How ought you to advise Miss Jarvis(a)with respect to Stripper and {b) with 
respect to the proprietor? 
(TORTS)One answer: A suggestion that a virtuous woman, if she were pretty, might 
take off her clothes in public, is insulting. Under the Virginia statute of insult-
ing words no damages need be shown. Hence Miss Jarvis has an action under that 
statute against Stripper and the proprietor. 
Another answer:(a)The words used are so conditional that they are ridiculous 
rather than insulting. They do not constitute slander per se and there were no 
damages so Stripper is not liable.(b)In Virginia libel appears to be subject to the 
same limitations as slander and hence proprietor is not liable either. See 200 va. 
572. Note: It is arguable that proprietor has used Miss Jarvis• name for advertis-
ing purposes in violation of her statutory right to privacy and that she is en-
titled to general and ··' ·· .also :· punitive damages under the statute. See V#B-650 • 
-:r&.o 10. Pedestrian, in daylight, while walking on the eastern sidewalk of Main Street, 
started to cross First Street from north to south at its intersection with Main. 
While walking between the cross-walk lines he was .struck and killed by an automo-
bile driven by Motorist in an eastern direction on First Street. At the time 
Pedestrian was struck he had almost completed his crossing and another step or two 
would have put him on the southern sidewalk. There were no traffic signals at this 
intersection, and the street was straight and the view unobstructed. Action was 
brought for damages and on the trial Motorist testified that he looked down Main 
Street for traffic and saw none; he then looked ahead on First Street and saw 
Pedestrian directly in front of him, that he applied his brake and cut to his left, 
but could not avoid striking Pedestrian. At the conclusion of the svidence,the 
r,l c:.intiff requested, over defendant's objection two instructions couched in -
appropriate language: ' 
(a) One telling the jury that if Pedestrian started across First Street before 
Motor~st entered the intersection, then Pedestrian had the right of way and it was 
~~tor1st•s duty either to change his course, slow down, or come to a complete stop 
l i necessary to permit Pedestrian to cross the street in safety, and 
~b) T~e o~her, telling the j~ry that, on the issue of contributory negligence, 
Peaestr1an ~s presumed to have exercised ordinary care for his own safety and that 
the bu:den 1s on the defendant to establish such negligence by a preponderance of 
the ev1dence. How ought the court to rule on each instruction? 
(TORTS) ~ince these both correct~y. state the law they should both be given. 
Note: S1nce these are not Ufinding instructionstt they need only be complete as 
to points of law stated therein. 
8 .D\~ Impatient aM GUSfie Guest, while shopping in Nortol.k,Va., deci= ~~rave 
• f D tme t store They arrived at a Tearoom aro lunch at the Tearoom 0 ~ n • lar 8 crowd there The hostess met them, 
p.m., and t!oun~:~ta:~~~: ~~!m~ ;:Y tabl~s in the Tear~om are individual 
led them a in a row and customers sit behind them on a 
tables of standard design &\"ranged ~t people beind the tables, the hostess 
long couch against the wall. In ::erth to ~ushes it back when the customer is seatedf 
customarily pulls the table out t blen t which Irma and Gussie were seated had 
as was done in this instance' 'J.be a es a im t 1 half an hour 
soiled dishes on than. After they had been seate:t~:~t~~~~~ a aw~~ess but was 
without being served, Irma tried to ~tt~t.:n:O her right caught her foot on the 
unable to do so. She thereupon got up, n k your advice as to whether she 
leg of the table, fell and broke )ler hip. Irma ~a s What would you advise? 
can recover rrom Department Store for h: inj~ ~;·the Store. There was nb defect. 
(TORTS) No. There was no negligeooe on e part insurer of her safety. See 194 Va. 
The situation was obvious. The Store was no an 
lOU. 
lO}~~eedy Jones was driving his car down Highway #58 in a southerly direction at • 
rapid rate of speed on the nigh of April 28,1960, at about 9s00p.m~ The night was 
dark and there was a d~nse fog or mist. Speedy Jones ran into a car driven by Glen 
Sike;:~ going in the · same direction and pushed it to the left side of the road where 
1 t came to a stop. Jones' car ran on a distance of 100 yards from the point of 
impact and ran off the road and came to rest in a field. Ula Sikes, wife of Glen 
Sikes, who was a passenger in her husband's car sustained back injuries in this 
collision. 
A car drtven by Robert Todd, traveling in the opposite or northerly direction, 
stopped on the. right side of the road beside the Sikes car and effered to take Mrs. 
Sikes to the hospital to get something done about the injuries to her back. While 
Todd, Ula a.pd Glen Sikes were standing beside the Todd car, an automoblo driven by 
,Joe WOodward, traveling in a southerly direction, negligently struck th~ Todd car, 
glanced off and struck Ula Sikes, breaking her right leg in two places. The. 
Woodward car then crashed into the Sikes car. 
Ula Sikes consults you as to whether Speedy Jones can be held responsible for the 
injuries she received in both accidents. How should you advise her? 
(TORTS) No. Jones' negligence had spent itself completely. The negligence of Weed-
ward was the sole proximate cause of the second accident. See 168 Va.)8. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
9.D~osperous Jones is the owner of a large farm on Highway #58 in Henry County, 
Virginia, consisting of land and valuable improvements such as mansion house,barns 
and other outbuildings. The State Highway Department of Virginia leased a portion 
of an adjoining farm owned by Red Barker, and is now operating, through the High-
way Department's agents and employees, a stone quarry to supply rock for the con-
struction of public roads. In the operation of this quarry frequent blasts with 
dynamite have to be made, which throw large chunks of rock and debris ont,o the 
premises of Prosperous Jones, damaging aom.e or Ids outbuildings, and his tenants 
have complained that the property is unsafe to be farmed wh:'Lle the stone quarry is 
in operation. 
Prosperous Jones consultu you as an attorney as to whethe: ~ he may maintain an 
action by motion for judgment against the Highway Commissio. -.-r of Virginia for 
damages beeaus,e of the careless, reckless and wanton operatir, n of the quarry by the 
employees of the State Hight ay Department. How would you adv .i .se Prosperous Jones? 
(TORTS) No. The State is no·, liable for its torts as we do net have a st,lte tort 
claims act. The employees have the immunity of the State as long as they are acting 
within the scope of their authority. There is no evidence that ;-.he Highway 
Commissioner was participating personally in the acts complaine~ of. If these acts 
amount to a taking of Jones' property his remedy is to mandamus the Highway 
Commissioner to bring condemnation proceedings. See 195 Va.655 o~1- P.l of the Torts 
St4pplement Cases followint~ P• 1047 of the Torts cases in these no t es. 
4~'Pat Jockey, a frequent patron of the race tracks and a etQdent of the art of de-
ception, conceived the following plan for acquiring ownership of Bull Run, a valuable 
race horse, and winning the Virginia Derby, a race for two year olds, with a $100,000 
purse: He would contract to purchas 9 Bull Run from Cy Trainer, promising to pay for 
the horse five days after thu runnillg of the Derby; and the day following the race 
he would sell Bull Run for such price as he could get, pocket his winnings, if any, 
and leave for parts unknown, without paying the agreed purchase price. Without dis-
closing his intentions to Trainer, Jockey procured from Trainer a written contract 
by the terms of which Trainer sold to Jockey his horse, Bull Run, for the sum of 
$20,000; $1,000 of which was then paid in cash, and $10,000 was to be paid five 
days after the running of the Virginia Derby. The contract provided that immediately 
upon the signing thereof, title to the horse should pass to Jockey. The contract 
was signed and Jockey acquired possession of the horse ~ Two days before the Derby, 
Trainer was told by Jack Skeeter that since the sale he had had an opportunity to 
observe Bull Run in one of his early morning workouts and that his speed was 
phenomenal and that the horse should easily win. Skeeter fQrther told Trainer that he 
overheard Jockey tell Confidant of his plan to sell the horse after the race and 
leave without paying the purchase price. Trainer promptly tendered to· Jockey the 
$1 000 he paid and demanded the return of the horse to h~n. Jockey refused. Trainer 
i~ediately consults you and inquires whether he may recover possession of the 
horse. What 1-rould you advise? 
(TORTS)(SALES) Yes, Trainer is entitled to bri ng a possessory action for the horse, 
or since the horse is unique, he i.s entitled to rescind in equity, because of the 
fr;ud. When Jockey promised to pay for the horse he impliedly represented that he 
then had an intent to pay as promised. Whether or not he had such an intent is a 
present material fact about which Jockey has lied. Because of this fraud Jockey only 
got a voidable title which Trainer may avoid at anytime before Jockey sells to a 
bona fide purchaser for value • 
B~'Johnny and Freddie Butterworth, 8 and 6 years of age, respectively, lived in the 
City of Richmond. The two br.others ·took great pleasure in riding atop freight cars 
being shifted in the railroad yards along the south bank of the James River. They 
had been warned several times. by Vigil, the yard watchman, to stay out of the yard 
and not to ride on the car~. On a warm afternoon during the month of May, and in • 
spite of Vigil's warnings, Johnny and Freddie went to the yards after Johnny had re-
turned from school, and climbed aboard one of the freight cars which was coupled to 
a switch engine. Vigil, who the boys thought was off duty, saw them and as the cars 
were being moved down the track he angrily yelled in a loud and piercing voice, 
"Get off that car or I'll throw you off.n Vigil's loud yell surprised and frightened 
both the boys and, as they ran along the top o.f the car, Freddie tripped over a 
stanchion which was in plain view, fell to the ground and was seriously injured. 
Shortly thereafter Freddie, proceeding by his next friend, brought an action against 
both the railroad and Vigil in the Lal-l and Equity CoLU't of the City of Richmond ask-
ing damages of $10,000. 
In their grounds of defense, the railroad and Vigil asserted (a)that Freddie was a 
trespasser to whom was owed no duty, and(b)that, in any event, Freddie was guilty of 
negligence which barred his right to recover. Are these good defenses? 
(TORTS)(a}Even if Freddie was a trespasser the defendants owed him a duty not to act 
negligently toward him after his presence was discovered. Vigil's sudden and unex-
pected outb1rst against children so young could be found by a jury to have been a 
negligent act for which he and his principal would be liable. (b) The rule in Virginia 
is that children under 7 are conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. 
9ft>h the morning of August 6,19.58, .Mrs., Shirley Williams was severely injured in an 
automobile accident which occLU'red in the City of Norfolk. Shortly after the accident 
she was taken from the hospital for examination to a laboratory operated in Norfolk 
by Dr. Albert Barr for the purpose of undergoing X-rays to determine the extent of 
injuries to her head. While the X-rays were being taken by Dr.Barr, he received an 
emergency telephone call which he answered and which cauSed Mrs.Williams to be sub-
jected to the X-rays for a time far greater than was necessary. The X-rays indicating • 
no skull fractures, Mrs. Williams was returned to the hospital from which she was 
discharged three weeks later. In December of 1960, Mrs. Williruns began suffering 
from headaches which became progressively worse; and in January of 1961 she became 
blind. A subsequent exrunination showed that her blindness had been caused by a tumor 
of the brain. On June 14,1961, Mrs. Williams brought an action against Dr. Barr in 
the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk alleging that the negligence 
of Dr. Barr in x .. raying her head for an unreasonable length of time had brought on 
her brain tumor and caused her blindness . Dr.Barr now consults you. He admits that 
he X-rayed Mrs. Williams an unnecessary length of time, and that this could have re-
sulted in her blindness. On fur~her questioning, he concedes that Mrs. Williams, 
prior to her loss of sight, had no way of learning she was suffering from a brain 
tumor, or learning its cause. Does Dr. Barr have any defense to the action? 
(TORTS) Yes, the two year statute of limitations. Our Supreme Court of Appeals has 
held that the statute of limitations starts running in negligence cases as soon as 
the wrongful act is comrr1itted whether or not the plaintiff knows or should know that 
he has been injur.ed. See 19.5 Va.82'7 in the Pleading and Practice cases in these Notes, 
and 185 Va.S6l(the silicosis case)on p.l033 of the Torts cases in these Notes. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
9.D'1lrank Mankin operated a business in which he had six employees. Poinder, Dext-er 
and Noble, three of his employees, were engaged to operate a machine which required 
skill and constant vigilence to avoid injury to the operators. Because of the tem-
porary absence of Noble, Frank Manl~in took his place at the machine and assisted 
in its operation. While the machine was in operation J'1ankin negligently stopped to 
light a cigarette and in doing so Poinder's attention to the machine was momentarily 
diverted. As a proximate result of the negligence of Manlcin and Poinder, Dexter 
was injured. Dexter sued Mankin t.o recover damages. Manldn defended upon the grounC' 
that Dexter assumed the risk of negligence of a fellow-servant. 
Is t .his a good defense? 
(TORTS) No. Since there vlere less than seven employees and no steps had been taken 
by the employer to come under ~'Jorkmen' s Compensation, common law principles apply. 
At common law the employer him 3elf cannot be a fellow servant. See 126 Va. 319. 
10.})~illiam Peyton for many years had purchased Grade A milk from the Green Dale 
Grocery Store. Peyton and his guest , Smi th, became ill, and upon an examination by 
their doctor it was determined that thei:c illnesses resulted from drinking the milk 
that had been purchased from the grocery store. It was determined that the milk 
was contaminated with germs of malta fever. Green Dale Grocery Store did not ex-
pressly warrant that the milk was fit for human consumption. Peyton and Smith em-
ploy you to sue Green Dale Grocery Store, if you determi ne that they have a good 
cause of action. What remedies, if any , do Peyton and Smit h have against Green 
Dale Grocery Store? 
('l'ORTS)(CONTRACTS)(SALES) Peyton may recover from Store as the latter impliedly 
warranted that the milk was fit for human consumption. But this implied warranty 
ran only in favor of Peyt,on as there :l.s no privity of contract between Smtth and 
store. If Smith wants to recover he must p l~ove negligence on the part of Store and 
there is nothing stated that indicates any such negligence. See Colonna v. Rosedale 
Dairy Co., 166 Va. 3lh. Note: In the light of general language in Swift v. Wells, 
the general tendency of the court s aioJay f rom the necessity of privity, and the pro-
tection of the guest by the Uniform Commercial Code, S1nith 1 s case would not be hope-
less. 
Q. 10 on p.546(Sales) Smith may also recover. The Virginia adaptation of u.c .c. 
#2-318 reads as follows: "Lack of privity betvreen pla.intiff and defendant shall be 
no defense in any a~tion brought agains t the mar.ufacturer or seller of goods to re-
cover damages for breach of •·mrrant y, expreGs or implied, o:c for negligence al-
though the plaintif:f did n~t ~urchase the good~ from t.he defendant, if the ~laintiff 
was a person whom the manuf ac·curer or seller mlght r easonably have expected to use 
consume, or be affected by the goods .'' ' 
B1~e and Doris had be~n ~datingA for some r-o- ~---
at her home in his autoinobile·. Doris usuall :~;zs, and Pete ~lways called for her 
she enjoyed doing so. Pete considered her t; be the autom~b~le on these dates, as ' 
Doris drove the car on such a date to a roadh a careful dr~ver. In March, 1962 
but Doris drank soft drinks Afterwards Do iouse, ~~~r? Pete drank several beer~ 
Pr . .lliam • ' r s was uz·1 nng them to d h ' 1nce W1 County, while Pete dozed As Do . war s er home in 
intersection, she mistakenly stepped on.the ac~~~e~~:~~d to slow down to turn an 
car went out of control, struck a light pole and Pet r ~nstead of the brake, the 
Pete sued Doris in the proper Virginia coU:.t ~ w.u injured• 
and th~ abaTe fac~ were proved without disput; ::etheg damages for his inj~iea, 
the ev1.dence, Dons mov~.Q. the court to strike Pete'• e trial. At the c~nclus1on of 
facts proved did not constitute actionable ne l. vidence, contending(l)that the 
d Do . . g l.gence on her part d(2)th 
an rl.B were jo1.nt venturera at the time of the accid ' an at Pete 
rule on each of Doris • contentions? ent • How should the court 
~TORTS) Neither or Doris' ~o~tentioM is correct. A man 
1n his own car so Doris owed Pete a duty ot ordina.r cannot be a gratuitous guest 
negligence. It is at least a jury question as to wh!~:e o~nd is liable for Ordinary 
Since Doris did not have an equal right to control the e not Doris vas negligent. 
venture or a.joint enterprise, and even if it were sh ar it wa~ not a joint 
negligently injured another party engaged in the ' je would Still be liable if ~h"' 
Fed. Su.pp. 143. - same oint enterprise. See 170 
.<1. >-' 9~ Painter drove his truck north on Main Street in the town of Gaston, Va. On the 
side of the truck opposite the driver's side, Painter had tied a ladder thirty feet 
long. A town ordinance made it a miademeanor to carry on the side of any vehicle 
a ladder which protruded beyond either bumper of the vehicle. As Painter passed 
through the interaection of Main and Eastern Streets, an automobile traveling east 
on Eastern Street struck the ladder where it protruded ten feet behind Painter's 
truck. The impact threw the ladder against the plate glass window of a store on the 
corner of the intersection, and Innocent, a customer inside the store, was injured 
by the broken glass. 
In an action for damages by Innocent against Painter, the above facts were proven. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Painter requested the court to instruct the jury 
that even if they believed he was guilty of negligence which Jll"OXimately caused the 
accident, they should neYertheless return a verdict in his favor if they further 
believed that the injuries to Innocent were not reasonably foreseeable by him. 
Should the court so instruct the jury? 
(TC?RTS) The instruetion should not be given. It is self contl'adictory because 
Pa4nter could not be guilty of negligence proximately causing the accident if there 
was no element or foreseeability. It is sufficient to foresee that some one in the 
zone of possible danger might be injured even th011gh the ex.aot manner· of injury 
might not have been reasonably foreseeable. ·• · 
-<'&.Y lOvla Jones was sitting on the front porch o! his home on Elm Street in Culpeper, 
a moYing van slowly passed by his house, and Jones noticed its driver looking at 
each house aa if searching for a part.ioular number. Suddenly, the van stopped, and 
without blowing his horn or otherwise signaling, or looking, the driver backed up 
rapidly .. A three-year old child was just then crossing the street behind the nn, 
and startled by the backing vehicle the child stwnbled and fell down in ita path. 
Jones, seeing the child • s peril, darted from the porch toward the child and wu 
S\lOCesstul in pushing him out of the truck's path, but Jones himself was etruiDk by 
the tail gate and painfully injured. 
Jones sued the truck driver at law for damages in tha p~per court. At the trial 
the above facta were proved, and at the conclusion of the evidence the drinr moved 
the court to strike Jonee' evidence on the ground that Jones was guilt)' of oontribu-
tory negligence ae a matter of law. How should the court rule? 
(TORTS) Jones 18 not guilt)' of 'contributory negligence as a matter of law. He exer-
cised that amount of care that an ordinary prudent courageous man would exercise. 
There was an emergency caused by defendant's negligence and Jones had oo time to 
make nice est;Lmates. "Danger invites rescue• and defeu:lant created the danger. 
8 'f' John Lord was the owner of a warehouse in the City of Newport News. The warehouse 
was quite old and badly in need of repair. On Jan.2,1963 Lord leased the building to 
Ben Tate for a term of four years at a low rental. A provision of the lease obli-
gated Tate to place the building in safe condition by repairs to be made within a 
period of three months. On April lOth Lord visited the build:i..ng and, seeing that 
Tate had not made the repairs required of him, stated that he must do so within the 
next thirty days or face evietion. Tate promised faithfully to make the repairs. 
However, by May 26th no repairs had been made and on that day while Frank Jones was 
carefully driving his automob~ .le in a public alley alongside the building a cornice 
of the building broke loose fell upon the automobile, and seriously injured Jones. 
Jones now consults you, r~citing the foregoing facts. He inquires what rights of 
action, if any, he might have (a)agai nst Lord, and (b) agains t Tate. 
vlliat should your advice be? 
(TORTS) Both are liable as joint tortfeasors. Lord ha.s leased premises that were in 
a dangerous state of disrepair and he cannot escape liability ts third ·parties 
rightfully on the highways by trying to get Tate to make the r epairs. Tate is liable 
because he i s negligently continuing a public nui sance, See #80 of Prosser on Torts 
(2 d Ed.). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
91f.:i'erry, an infant patient in Disabled. Children's Hospital, a charitable corporation 
of Bedford, was fatally burned due to the negligence of a night nurse who was an 
employee. Frank Walton, the father of Jerry, upon hearing of the fatality raced to 
the hospital late at night, and on entering the hospital fell into an unlighted 
elevator shaft and suffered serious personal injuries • 
Shortly thereafter, Walton filed two motions for judgment in the Circuit Court of 
Bedford County against the Hospital. The first, as Administrator of Jerry lvalton, 
was for his wrongful death, and the second was for his own personal injuries caused 
by falling into the elevator shaft. 
In each case, the Hospital filed identical defenses, viz. that the Hospital was a 
charitable institution and was not liable for the negligence of its employees. 
In both trials, the uncontradicted ev:!.dence showed that the Hospital had exercised 
due care in the selection and retention of its employees, but in each instance there 
was clear evidence that due care had not been exercised by the defendant's employees. 
In each case, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. 
'rhe attorney for t.he defendant Hospital has moved to set aside each verdict on the 
ground of charitable immunity. 
How should the court rule on the motion to set aside (l)in the action for wrongful 
death of Jerry Walton; and (2) in the action for the personal injuries to James 
vlalton? 
(TORTS)(l)The motion to set aside the verdict for damages for the death of Jerry 
Walton should be granted. He was the recipient of the charity and . tp~ defendant has 
the charitable immunity from suit in Virginia when sued by a persoii»ty a privy of 
such person who is the beneficiary of the charityo .~~ .. 
~ ...: J 1ne rnu~:..Lun "(,O set. as~de 'the verdict for the injury to the father would be 
cenied. He was not the beneficiary of the charity. The Hospital owed him at least a 
dut.y t,o warn of the danger even if he were only a licensee. 
Virginia cases in point are 131 Va.587; 187 Va.5; 200 Va.878. 
10.16gi.ll Careless operated his truck in a westerly direction on Route 7 in Clarke 
County. Noticing a friend plowing corn in a field to his right, Caraless parked his 
truck with the left wheels standing on the traveled portion of the west-bound l ane, 
and walked into the field to converse with his friend. 
John Bull, while traveling in a westerly direction on the same road and when he 
was approximately 500 feet to the rear of the parked truck, observed the approach 
of an automobile traveling in an easterly direction and operated by Sally Prudence. 
As Bull approached the parked truck he applied his brakes, but as they were not in 
proper adjustment, a fact known to Bull, he was unable to bring his car to a stop. 
Although Bull reduced his speed, his autom~bile swerved slightly to the left and 
struck the corner of the parked truck. Losing control of his car, Bull's vehicle 
collided wlth the a.utomobil.e driven by Sally Prudence at a point 100 feet west of 
the parked truck. Sally l~udence was injured ar.d sued both Careless and Bull in the 
same action to recover damages. 
In the trial of the action the foregoing facts were proved by Sally Prudence. 
When the plaintiff rested her case, each defendant moved the court to strike 
plaintiff's evidence. How should the court rule on eaeh motion1 
(TORTS) The evidence should be stricken as to Careless, but not as to Bull. The sole 
proximate cause of the accid<mt was the later negligence of Bull. Careless is not 
required to anticipate that o~hers will drive cars with defective brakes. In 173 Va. 
448 it is said, "Where a seconti t ort--feasor becomes aware, or by the exercise of 
ordinary care should be aware, of the existE:nce of a potential danger created by the 
nealigence of an original tort···feasor, and thereafter by an independent act of 
ne~ligence brings about an accident, the condition created by the first tort-feasor 
becomes merely a circumstance of the accident, but is not a proximate cause thereof. 
The original negligence of the first tort-feasor is legally insulated by the inter-
vening independent negligence of the second tort-feasor, and the latter becomes the 
sole proximate cause of the accident." 
Note: Considerable credit probably will be given for an answer that states that 
the evidence should not be stricken as to either, for it is at least a jury question, 
or for a well reasoned argument contrab ouch as Bull's having bad brakes was ante-
cedent negligence, and hence that he did not thereafter bring about the accident 
by a new act of negligence. 
7 .bf~ the early morning hours of February 12, 1963, Albert 11uffett of the City of 
Fredericksburg finished playing poker with some close friends and got in his auto-
mobile to hurry home. A heavy snow had fallen and, although it had been cleaned from 
the streets, remained on the branches of overhanging tree limbs. As 11uffett neared 
his home a heavy limb broke from one of the trees, fell across the top of Muffett's 
automobile, and caused a slight cut across his forehead. He was not otherwise in-
jured. Unable to extricate himself from the automobile, Muff ett remained in the car 
until 6:30 o'clock in the morning when a passerby discovered him and drove him 
toward the hospital. However, on the way to the h0spi.tal Muffett died as a r esult of 
profuse bleeding from the cut across his forehead. Thereafter the Administrator of 
Maffett's estate brought an action against the City of Fredericksburg asking damages 
of $35,000 for the wrongful death of Nuffett. On the trial of the case evidence 
showed that the limb which f ell upon Muffett 1 s car was old and rotten, and that this 
had been know~ : to the City for many months prior to the accident; that Muffett had 
been driving prior to, and at the time of, the accident 20 miles per hour in excess 
of the speed limit; that Muffett was affl:i.cted with the rare and hereditary disease 
of hemophilia which prevents cessation of bleeding; and that had he not been so 
afflicted he wculd not have died. When both par ties had rested, the City, conceding 
its own negligence, moved the Court to strike the plai nti ff's evidence on the 
following grounds: 
! \J'-' ...... • 
(a) that Muffett's car would not have been struck by the falling limb had he been 
driving from the poker game to. his home at a lawful rate of speed, and 
(b) that the City could not be held liable for the vrrongful death of Muffett in 
that it could not be charged with a duty to foresee that the fallen limb would injur 
a person suffering from such a rare and hereditary disease. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of the motion? 
(TORTS) Neither ground is valid.(a)Muffett 1 s negligence in speeding was not the 
cause of the limb falling on him. If he had driven evenfaster, he would likewise 
have escaped injury. It was just a coincident circumstance or condition that Muffett 
happened to be there at that time. See 43 A.240; Prosser on Torts,(2d Ed.) p.286. 
{b) A manwith a disability is not an outlaw and is entitled to recover the damages 
he has suffered as a result of defendant's negligence even if they were not complete· IY foreseeable. Prosser on Torts,(2d Ed.) p.260. 
l>b"7 8 Y On the aft ernoon of November 14, 1963, Jack Holmes drove through a stop sign 
while coming out of a side street into Main Street in the City of Lynchburg and 
crashed into an automobile driven by Robert Charles. Holmes lost consciousness as 
his car careened across Main Street and came to a stop in its west bound lane. At 
the time of the collis ion, William Stock was deiving his automobile along Main 
Street in a westerly direction approximately 500 feet east of the place of the 
accident. Stock who had seen the accident occur, and who thought he could pass by 
it safely by driving to his left and passing between the automobiles of Holmes and 
Charles, continued driving along Main Street. However, when attempting to pass 
between the vehicles of Holmes and Charles, he found the space too narrow and 
collided with the rear of Holmes' automobile. That collision caused serious personal 
injuries to Holmes who has now brought an action against Stock in the Corporation 
Court of the City of Lynchburg to recover damages for those injuries. 
Stock now consults you, and asks your advice on whether he has a good defense to 
the action. What should your advice be? 
{TORTS) No. Holmes' negligence had completely spent itself at the time of Stock's 
collision with him, and hence was not a proximate cause of the collision with Stock. 
Besides Stock had a last clear chance of_avoiding the accident, but instead of so 
doing, failed to use due care when he attempted to drive through the nar:ow space 
between the two cars. 11Where the injured person has negligently placed h1mself in a 
situation of peril from which he is physically unable to remove himself, the defend-
ant is liable if he saw, or should have seen, him in time to avert the accident by 
using reasonable care." 197 Va.233 at p.2}8. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
bb ~ 6~ k Bu h holesaler in pickles contracted with Super-
9. ~ntMa! oft~ ~elicit 1b8 b~r:ls of grade A dill pickles, delivery to be made on ~~a:b:: ~:·1963. During the fall of 1963, there was a shortage of good qualit~ dill 
· nd h could be then purchased from wholesalers only at advanced pr1ces. p1ckles, a sue h t · 
1 o tober Burch growing ,short of his dill pickle supply, but knowing t a h1s o~d ~riend'Frank ~arks who ran a small grocery chain in the City of Richmond was 
1 i d Of such pickles voluntarily offered to sell 120 barrels of grade A sore y n nee , . 
1 
• 
dill pickles to Parks at a low price. Although knoW1ng of Burch s contract W1th 
M k ts Inc and that the purchase from Burch would exhaust all Burch's Super- ar e , • · d 
1 Parks nevertheless accepted the proposal of Burch and paid h1m the agree s~i~ey~n delivery of the dill pickles. On November 1st, Burch being unable to make 
p 1 · to Super Markets Inc. the latter purchased 100 barrels of grade A dill de 1very - ' , . • . 
pickles from another source paying therefor a pr1ce $1,000 1n excess of that con-
tracted for by Burch. 
Super-Markets, Inc. now consults you and inquires whether it has a cause of 
ction against Parks. What should you advise? 
aTORTS) It has not. Title to the pickles had not passed to Super-Markets. Burch 
( t•ll buy other pickles on the market. Parks has not actively sought to injure 
can 
8 ~ · • 11 th · 11 t t · · i M k ts See Torts Restatement #766 and espec~a y e ~ us ra ~on g~ven n Super- ar e • 
Comment i thereto. 
B 1~tn Parks sued Bill I)pz,~r in the Circuit Court cf Gocchland County, Va., to re-
cover damages for personal injtU"ie;3 resulting f:com an ~utcmobile collision. At the 
trial of the case the evidence established the ·~allowing facts: The collision of 
the automobiles occurred at nighttime; Dozer was operating his car. with his head-
lights on high beam; no other traffic >-ras approaching from the direction in which 
Dozer was traveling; Dozer had been driYing for t-welve hours without rest and was 
sleepy; Parks, who had been traveling in the same direction as Dozer, had stopped 
his car in Dozer 's lane of traffic to talk to a friend of his who was standing by the 
roadrJide and while thus parked he turned on his parking lights, but due to faulty 
wiring the taillights on his car were not bu:-ning.; Parks ' car was black in color and 
the night was very dark and there was some fog; for a very brief r.1oment before 
Parks r car came rr.i. thin tbe range of Doz erf s headlights, Dozer noddccl t<!ith sleep and 
w!-len he awoke his car was approxim.:ltely two CaT lengths behind Parks' car; Parks• car 
would have been observable within the r·nnge of D..- ,:;arts headJ.:i.gl'lt~ when the Dozer car 
was six lengths behind Parks' ~~r;stcu·tJ.ed by the sudden appearance of Parks' car in 
his lane of traffic, Dozer foreitly applied the br akes of his car which was then 
traveling at the J.a;ttful speed of 55 rdles per hour, but he wus unable to bring his 
car to a stop before it struck the rear of Parks' car; Dozer, in tha exercise of 
ordinary.car~, could ~ave avoi~ed strik~ng the rear of P~·ks' car had he, immediately 
upon see~ng ~t: cut h1s car to the left, but because of h~s alarm and the brief 
moment for acti on he elect.ed to attempt. to avoid the coll:i.sion by applying his brakes 
At the conclusion of the evidence the Court overruled Dozer's motion to strike the 
plaintiff's evidence, ~-Thereupon Doz 3r requested the Court to give an instruction on 
sudden emergency. Sho,lld the L1struction be given? 
(TORTS ) No. Dozer is not entitled to such an instruction because the sudden emergenoy 
was due to his own fault. See 197 Va~240. 
9fb/In the trial of an aG~ion. for. fraud and deceit, commenr~ ed by John Sawyer against 
sfephen Forester, the folloWlng facts were proved:Sawyer operated a sawmill and was 
engaged in the manufacture of lwnber; Forester called upon Sawyer at the latter's 
home in Roanoke, and offered to sell to him a tract of pine timber, aituat.ed in 
Stafford County, Va.; Sawyer told ForcGter that he was only interested in making 
purchases of timber tracts that would produce not less than 3,ooo,ooo baard feet of 
high quality pine lmnbf'Jr; thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, "I have owned this 
tract for 10 years, I have been over it many times, 
c:.nd j_t is my op~m.on that tW.s tract of timher will cut 3,250,000 board feet of 
beD.nti ful pine lwnber, the highest quality'~; Sawyer kne·w that Forester had bought 
and sold ti~ber t~acts for more than 20 years and that Forester had bean employed 
f or many years by different lumber companies to cruise timber tracts and to advite 
thorn upon the quality of timber; Saviyer told Forester that he was leaving the next 
day for a t.:-:Lp West am that he would not return for 2 months and because he would 
not have a chance to examine the timber he was not interested in purchaslng it; 
thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, nr am anxious to sell this tract of' timber im-
mediately and I know it is what you want, and I repeat that it is my opinion that 
you cannot find better quality pine and I am also of the opinion that this t:cact will 
cut out at least 3,250,000 board : feettt; Sawyer then said to Forester, "I know you 
have ha.d a lot of experience and I accept your st.a.tement regarding the quality and 
quantity of the timber, and I am willing to buy your tract of timber and pay you the 
r-um of $19$5oon; the written l!.ontract of sale and purchase, hereafter set out, Wets 
then signsd by the parties; during Sawyer's absence his employees, at his direction, 
cut and removed the entire tract of t:L-nber and Sc:.wyer J.ee.x-nro upon his return the 
tract prcd.uced only l.llOOO,OOO board feet of lumber; unbeknown to Sawyer, Forester 
had never cruised t.h'3 timber tract but he belived that the tract actually did contain 
J,2.50,000 board feet of timber; and plaintiff introduced in evidence the following 
written contract: 
'!I, Stephen Fores·cer, do hereby sell to Joi"'..n Sawyer the entire tract of pine 
timber, situated on my Pine 'I'op Farm, Staf ford Co1mty, Va., and John Sawyer 
does herawith agree to pay for said tra\)t of timber upon the signing of this 
contract the sum of $19,500, 
"Witness the following signatures and seals: 
11/a/ Stephen Forester (Seal) 
2/s/ John Sawyer (Seal)n 
After all of the evidence had been introduced defe~dant. movod to strike plaintiff's 
evj.dence and that sunnnary judgmen·~ be entered fer defenG.ant. How should the Court 
rule? 
{TORTS) Either of two answer.:;: (1) The motion ohould be grant.sd... Forrester only 
expressed a~ opinion. If SavJyer wanted to protect himself he uould easily have done 
s o by requiring a 1"arranty of quantity . The parti es were on equal terms. There is 
no evidence that Forester lied about his opinion, or (2) The moti on should be over-
ruled. It is at least a jury question as to whether or not Forester really had such 
an opinion. It is most unlikely that an e~cperienced timb'3::- cruiser could make such 
a gross mistake. If Forester misrepresl3nted his opinion, and his op~n~on was 
material, c:.s here, he has misrepresen~ed a fact. The opinion was meant to be relied 
upon and was justifiably relied upon. 
See 199 Va.l8 and Prosser and Torts ##89 and 90 ~ 
lo?'"'J immy Underpass, 17 years of a.ge, inv·it0cl Tor.nny Childres ~' ;. 13 ~ears of ag?, to 
r ide with him on his single-seated motoTeycle ¢ Ci!ildress seated h~self astrlde the 
gas tank, between th6 ~eat and the handlebars, and Unde2·pas e occu.p~ed the only seat 
on the motorcycle .. While proceGding c;.long a street in the City of Lynchburg, Va,, 
the motorcycle collided at an ir.terso.:;tion with another vehicle and Childress was 
seriously injured~ A City Ordinan~e mada it. unlawful for tho op~rator of a m~tor­
cycle to car ry more persons than there are seats available, and 1.~ also made 1.t 
unlawful for any person to ride or be tranDported upon such a veh~cle unless occupy-
i ng a regular s eat. A viola tion of t his ordinance 1v-ould result in the imposition 
of a f ine • . Childress, by his next friend, sued Underpass to recover damages for 
personal injuries. During the t r lal of the case defendant requested and the Court 
gave an instruction telling the j t~y that Childress was guilty of negl~gence ~ ~e 
i n violating tile ordinancd, and if such negligeme Mnstit.uted a contnbuting proxi-
mate cause of the collision plaintiff could not re~over. The jury returned a verdict 
for the defendant and upon a motion to set aside the verdi,~t plai ntiff contended that 
the Court committed error in in:.;truct.ing the jury that plaintj_ff' s violati on of the 
ordinance constituted negli gence per ee ~ 
How should the Court rule -· on th"Etmoti on to set aaide the verdict'? 
~:Cf~TS ) '~h? motion Dhould be granted. In Virginia t hl;'re is a rebuttnble prnsu:m.pti on 
nat a chll d over 7 ar.d under 11. is incapable of being contribut orily noglig':mt 
vmc:the: his conduct is to he tested on common law p:;:J.~ciples or in view o:f a statute, 
or or~l~an~e. He nce it was e~ror to instrur.t the jury that plaintiffs violation of 
the or dl.nano..;e constituted negligence per se. 197 Va .572. 
• 
• 
• 
9 Dr.~,· k · "'"h ~- c 
.. O·v s, now1.ng t.. al'_. ,lyde had worked ~or demolition firms for about a year as a 
laborer, contracyacl w1.th Clyde to d r:m10l1.sh two buildings on Otis' t 
contract provided that for $2,500 Clyde would furnish aJl labor prho~er Y• The 
· 1 · 1 · · · . - · , mac 1nery, and matena., 1nc ud1.ng ~plosives ~ and would be responaible !or all details to 
accomphsh the d emoht1on i? s1.xt.y days. BE::t~ause of the slowness of the liOrk Cl 
obtai?ed a crane, ?ever hc-~·nng _ us~d one before;> and while using the crane and' yde 
blast:wg some fGOt:i.ngs, one bulldlng w2.s caused to fall and damage the ad ·0 • • building of Neighbors. J lnJ..ng 
In an action by NeighborJ against Otis and Clyder it 1.vas shown that th k 
do e pursua t .... th t · • ·- ·· -~h · - e wor was n
1
_ nf vO .e ~on r ave, vJl.v no dlre(~tJ..On and cont:::-ol by Otis, and that the 
neg 1.~ence o . Clyde, J.n fact~ ~ausF.:d the damage. Is Otis liable to Neighbors? 
(TORTS) Yes under three pcss1.ble tbeorit)s. (1) Otis himself ha"' be 1 · . 
letting a mere lbaborer handle hea:vy maehinery a nd explosiv8 s ~r(2 e)2"' ?1eg_J..gen~ 1? 1 . t d. . 1 1' - • , , vvul e a prJ.ncJ..-pa t ~3 no . o~ 1.nar1 y 1a~le for the torts of his independent contractor an ex-
ce~(~o)? ~1s s _wh~r~ - tht: 1.ndependent eon~-ractor ~s engaged in extra-hazardous work 
01 1n ~orne JUrls 1.C 1.ons one engages 1.n tmch 1cl1erently dangerous work at his ' 
!'E::-il··- ·Le, he is absolutely liable for darnnges caused, and one cannot escape such 
liability by getting some one else to do the job for him8 
v&i 
10 /,SpQr~ had the gasoline tank on his alltomobile filled with gasoline at the Heek 
Oil Co o After traveling two miles, his engine quit, and he stopped his automobile 
t.·pp0site Pristine Gas Company stationo Attentive, an employee of Pristine, 
diagnosed the trollble as water in the gasoline and, at Sport's insistence, agreed t o 
drain t he eighteen--gallon automobile tank by using a six- gallon tire-tes-ting tank. 
When it vJaB apparent that the gasoline ,,Jas draining very slowly, Sp:.>rt bec.ame hn-
patient and increasingly angry and insisted on going back to Meek Oil Co. to P.'.a.!ce 
complaint. After repeated urging, Attentive took Sport back to Meek Oil Co • . 1 and 
Sport learned that Meek, in fact, had negligently allmved Ha tcr to mix with the 
gasoline. While they were gone the ree;.eptacle into which the gasoline was draining 
overflowed, and a passerby, Curious, v1ondered aloud if it was water or gasoline 
that was in the gutt er and to fitld out threw a lighted match in it with the :;,·esult 
that Spol~t s automobile was destroyed by fire. 
Sport brought an v.Gtion for damages against Meek Oil Co. fo r the loss of his 
automobile. I::J Sport entitled to a recovery? 
(TORTS) No. The act of Meek Oil Co. was not the proximate cause of the loss as there 
was an efficient intervenine ar.t of another pa~ty or parties not reasonably fore-
seeable by Meek Oil Co. Bes ides Spcrt 1.ras h:l.msdf negligent in not thinking of the 
draining operation 1-1hen he wa s ::;o i r • .J i s t o-cnt that he be taken to Meek Oil Co ., 
See 171 Vao62, 197 S.E . I.~-68 c,n_ p ... l 020 of the Tor.t Case s i n these ~· Notes. 
2 June Exam 1965. 65:). 
'7. The We-Rent-Urn Corporation was in the bilsiness of renti.ng automobiles to be dri·Je:.l 
ty ths person to whom the car vras :!.eased. Smith rented a car from this corpon :c:i.or1 
and while using it. struck and seriously inju:ced Pedestrian. The particular car j_i1"· 
'Valved had been driven several years and its brakes had become defective, due to 
which cau::;e Smith was unable to control it properly and had run a red light at a 
crossing where Pedestrian had the right of way. Pedestrian sued the T~Te-Rent ,Um 
Corporation alleging, that if it had made a reasonable inspection of the automobile 
before its rental the defect would he.ve been discovered, and that such insp0cn;ion 
was not made~ Assuming that the proof sustained these allegations, is the corpora·· 
tion liable to fedestrian for his injuries? 
(TORTS) Yes. Such injuries could be reasonably foreseen. Prosser on Torts (3rd Ed .. ) 
PP• 685-686 reads, "The lessor of an automobile, or any other bailor .for hire, is 
liable to a guest in the vehicle, or a person run down by i t on the highway, not onl:r 
if he knows that the car is dangerously defective at the time he turns it over, or 
that the person entrusted with it is incompetent to handle it, but also if he merely 
fails to make reasonable inspection to discover possible defects before turning it 
ov-er.11 
~< . 8 .Crumbley owned a large farm, part of which lay betvreen the highway and Lake Beaut:!.-
ful. Fo~tunate owned a handsome residence on the other side of the highway. 
Fortunate's front porch commanded an at·t;rac t i.ve view across Crumbley's pasture field 
to the lake beyond. Crumbley became angry at F0rt.unate over a business transaction, 
and while he needed a new da.::!.r y barn and there were several other sui table l ocations 
for it, he built it in his pasture directly in front of Fortunate's residence, 
cutting off the view of the l ;,'.lce and seriously deprBciating the value of the resi-
denee, remarking to his contractor·, "I guess this v:ill teach that stu~kup dude that 
I can get even with him. 11 
Fortunate sued C:rumbley for damages to his property allegi.ne that the barn was 
placed on its present ]ocation out of spitu and malice, and t hat his property was 
damaged by at least ~~10,000. Assume the eYidence established the above facts, is 
Fortunate entitled to recover damages? 
(TORTS) Fortunate is not entitled to dama.ges. Crumbley was privileged t o build a 
barn on his own land . If the barn als o se1~ved a useful purpose it is not a private 
nuisance and it is immaterial that there was a s pite motive also. Fortunate is not 
entitled to an easement of view over Crumbley' s land unless t he lat ter grants such 
an easement to him. See Prosser on Tor~.s (3rd Ed.) P.619, note 19~ 
t.S~ 
92'Thom, whi le motoring on a pleasure trip~ negligently struck Pedestrian in Roanoke, 
breaking both his l egs . w"hiJe Pedestrian was lying helples s in the roadway, jonGs , 
not keeping an adequate loolcouJ0, ran over and broke Pedeat.:!.'ian ' s armo 
What is the extent of liability, if any , for the injuries sust ained ,(a) with 
respect to Thorn, and (b) with respect to Jones? 
(TOH.TS) Thorn is liable for both injuries. Jones i s liabl e onJ y for the broken arm. 
P.co8ser on Torts (2nd Ed.) p o2 30 r eads in part. as follovJS~ " I£' an automobile negli-
gently driven by defendant A strike3 the plaintiff , frac tLtres his skull, and leaves 
him helpless on the hi.gh~ray, where shortly afterward a second automobile, negligent-
ly driven by defend::mt B, run3 over him and br"eaks hi s leg, A will be Hable for 
both injuries , for when the plaintiff was left i n the highway , it was r easonably to 
be anticipated that a second car 'tvould r un him down. But. defendant B should be 
liable only for the br oken leg, sin,;e he hac'l no part in causing the fractured skull, 
a nd could not foresee or avoid i t!1' 
,... 
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8 ii and Bill unemancipated infant brothers, residing in the same household, were 
dating their r~spective girl friends, Martha and Barbara. Al drove them to a Drive-
In movie in his 1965 Plymouth sedano On their way home, all occupants of the car 
were injured vJhen Bill, while driving Al's car, lost control of it and struck a 
telephone pole in Bath County, Va. No other vehicle was involved • 
Separate personal injury actions were brought on behalf of Al, Martha and Barbara 
against Bill in the Circuit Court of Bath County. 
What degree of negligence on the part of Bill must Al, Martha and Barbara each 
prove in order to recover? 
(TORTS) Al need prove only ordinary neglig~nce. He cannot be a guest.in his own car. 
The two young ladies must prove gross negl1gence as they were non-paY1ng passenger 
guests of Al and/or his . c_~J.auffeur, Bill. 1rJhile it is ~rguab~e tha~ Al 1 s dat~ was not 
Bill's guest the l;>etter v1ew would seem to be that thJ.s entJ.re tr1p was soc1al 
rather than business and hence the girls should be treated as if they were non-paying 
guests whether Bill or Al is the one who is driving. 
9 }) ~fnes while operating a truck in the scope of his employment by Smith, was in-
volved i~ an accident in the City of Richmond with an automobile being driven by 
Thomas. The truck was owned by Smith, and he was a passenger in it at the time of 
the accident. Both Smith and Thomas suffered injuries proximately caused by the 
accident. 
Smith brought a joing action against Jones and Thomas for his personal inju;:iGs, 
and Thomas brought a similar action against Smith and Jones. Both actions ·Here 
l::rought in the appropriate Richmond court. 
Assuming that the evidence showed that Jones was guilty of gross negligence, 
lJhile Thomas was guilty of only simple negligence, but that the conduct of bot.h 
proximately cor..tributed to cause the accident. (A) May Smith recover agains ·~ either 
Jones or Thomas? (B) M~y Thomas recover against either Jones or Smith? 
(TORTS)(A) S.<·nith may recover from his servant, Jones but not against Thomas. Jones 
violated a duty he owEd his employer when he drove negligently. Jones' negligence 
is imputed to Smith in Smith's action against Thomas and constitutes a bar to any 
recovery. 
(B) No. Thomas' negligence bars any action he might otherwise have. 
/ 
lo£16i.terbert Homeowner undertook to revamp the exterior of his home. He decided t o 
do the paint job himself, but for a needed replacement of some of the slate on his 
roof he secured an independent roofing contractor to join in the undertaking on a 
cost basis. 
Roy Roofrunner, an employee of the roofing contractor, arrived at Homeowner's 
house to do the roof work. He found there a large scaffold extending from the 
ground to the top of the house , a.nd which had been recently constructed by Home-
owner, who was temporarily away f~om the premises~ Already on the scaffold was 
Yorrick Yardman, a neighoor 7 s serva.nt, who had found the scaffold a handy means of 
taking advantage of his permission 'of long standing to eather apples from Home-
owner's tree, n~ct to which the scaffold now stoo~. 
Perceiving that this scaffold was the only access to the roof, Roofrunner pro-
ceeded up it immediately to start his work. At this point the scaffold collapsed as 
a r esult of its neglig0nt construction by Homeowner, injuring both of its occupants. 
Is Homeowner liable in damages for the injuries sus~ained by (A) Roofrunner, and 
(B) Yardman? 
(TORTS) (a) Homeowner is liable to Roofrunner who ~ms a business visitor. He owed a 
duty to him to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Roofrunner was 
impliedly invited to use the scaffolding. (b) Homeovmer is not liable to Yardman 
who was a bare licensee. He owed Yardman no duty of prevtsi on. Yardman took the 
premises as he found them. The scaffold was built for Roofrunner--not for Yardman • 
7.~ne evening James Dove and his wire Shirley, intending to visit their friends Mr. 
and Mrs. Bates, mistakenly went to the wrong residence and knocked on the front door. 
The door was opened by Andy Gwnp, who was owner of the residence and the operator of 
a neighborhood confectionary. When ·he saw James Dove he became livid with anger and 
said, "You are the customer I saw steal $10 from my cash register this afternoon 
and run from my store before I could catch you." Thereupon Gump seized Dove, dragged 
him into the hallway, struck him across the face and forced him into the hallway 
closet, locking the door. He then c~;tled through the door to Dove cmd said, "You 
are going to stay in that closet until you either return my money or tell me where 
you have hidden it.tt With that Shirl~y Dove ran screaming from the house in search 
of a policeman. Although Dove protested to Gump his innocence, Gump refused to 
release him. After having been locked in the closet approximately twenty minutes, 
Dove succeeded in breaking open the door, running past Gump, and making his esc3no~ 
Dove now consults you and asks that you advise him of what cause or causefj of action 
he has against gwnp. 
Assuming Dove innocent of the charges made against him by Gwnp, how should you 
advise him? 
(TORTS) Slander, insulting words, assault and battery, false imprisonment. 
e~aam Grew was driving his Volkswagen with his wife as a passenger in the bu'3i!l~V5S 
section of the City of Richmond. While driving at a high rate of speed.!' Gr ~lW ·t.n:..~:-~tnd 
to the left from Main Street on to Eighth Street and the vehicle ,_, tert:J.rned. P.c!.~n 
Grew was rendered unconscious. Although Mrs. Grew was throvm out of the V0lkmm.r_s'.m, 
it fell heavily on the lower part of her body and pinned her beneath it. H:cs. Gj~ew 
at once began to scream from the extreme pain she was suffering, and Thonms Keene 
rushed from the sidewalk and with great effort raised the vehicle sufficiently to 
permit Mrs. Grew to crawl free. Because of his efforts in aiding Mrs. Grew, K~ne 
suffered torn muscles in his back and was bedridden for approximately six weeks. 
Thereafter, Keene sued Adam Grew in the Law and Equity Court of the City of 
Richmond for $61 000 damages charging Grew with negligence proximately causing Keene's 
injuries. In his grounds of defense, Grew alleged Keene had assumed the risk and was 
guilty of contributory negligence. During the trial, and while Keene was on the 
witness stand, counsel for Grew asked him, "How old are you?tt Keene answered, "I am 
68". Grew's counsel then asked, . "Didn1t you realize that you ran considerable risk 
of injury to yourself in lifting that Volkswagen off of Mrs. Grew?u Keene replied, 
Yes. I knew that ij was a dangerous thing for me to do, but I felt I had to do some-
thing to help Mrs. Grew." Shortly thereafter Keene rested his case, and counsel for 
Grew moved the Court to strike Keene's evidence o~the ground that the latter's 
testimony showed him to have assumed the risk and to be guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. How should the Court rule? 
(TORTS) It is at least a jury question as to whether Keene assumed the risk and 
therefore Grew's motion should be denied. The general rule is that one who ~~as a 
pereon in imminent and serious peril caused by the negligence of another cannot be 
charged with contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life 
or serious injury in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not 
recklessly or rashly made. 2 Restatement of Torts #472; Andttews, 192 Va. 150; 
wright, 110 Va. 670; Southern, 114 Va. 723. 
9~~le Alfred Romeo was 500 feet away from, and driving in a westerly direction 
toward, a two lane bridge suspended over the Dan River in Halifax County, he saw 
Thomas MacBeth standing against the railing of the bridge and fishing from its 
right side. At the same time, Romeo saw distantly approaching in the eastbound lane 
an automobile being driven by Goeffry Hamlet. Romeo did not slacken his speed and, 
to avoid Macbeth, on nearing him Romeo swung his automobile into the eastbound lane 
of traffio. Before he could return to the westbound lane, the left front portion 
of his automobile collided with the left fran portion of that being driven by 
Hamlet. As a result of the collision, Hamlet suffered severe injuries. Shortly 
thereafter, Hamlet brought an action against both Romeo and Macbeth in the Circuit 
Court of Halifax County charging each with negligence contributing to his injuries. 
Neither Romeo nor Macbeth charged Hamlet with contributory negligence. During the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
trial, the foregoing facts were proven. After all evidence was in, Hamlet offered 
several instructions to the Court, one of which read as follows: 
"The Court instructs the jury that an ordinance of Halifax County makes 
it a misdemeanor for any person to fish from a bridge over which there 
is vehicular traffic. A~cordingly, should you believe from a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the 'defendant Macbeth was fishing from the 
bridge at the time of the accident involved in this case, that in so 
doing he caused the defendant Romeo to swerve his automobile i!!to the 
eastbound land, and that this contributed to the collision between 
the vehicle of the defendant Romeo and that of the plaintiff Hamlet, 
then you should find bhe defendant Macbeth guilty of negligence and 
return your verdict against him and for the plaintiff Hamlet.n 
Counsel for Macbeth conceded that this instruction correctly recited the ordinance 
of Halifax County, but objected to the giving of the instruction assigning grounds 
1 therefor. Should this objection have been sustained? (TORTS) Instruction is incorrect as the negligence of Romeo intervened and insulated 
the negligence of Macbeth. Hubbard, 173 Va.448, at PP• 455 & 456. 
TORTS 12 ~f> 1. on Saturday afternoon, at 2:30 o'clock, Rose Gardner entered the self-
service store of Cash & Carry Grocery, Inc., in a ommunity shopping center1 
in virginia, for the purpose of doing her week ly shopping. The shelves 
upon which the articles of merchandise were placed were arranged to serve 
the onvenience of the customers, the bottom shelves standing a short dis-
tance above the floor. While reaching to a top shelf to obtain an article 
of merchandise, Rose Gardner placed her right foot three or four inches 
under the bottome shelf and \olh e n she turned to move away she slipped and 
fell to the floor severely injuring her knee. After arising from the floor 
she noticed a small dark object about an inch and a half long at one end 
of a skid mark on the floor about six inches in l Pngth. Upon examining 
the object it was determined to be a small onion which\vas discolored. 
The manager of th e store was promptly notified and upon investigation he 
saw th e skid mark, the discolored onion, and observed that Rose Gardner 
ltad a great amount of swelling in he r l ~nee. Shortly thereafter Rose Gardner 
sued ~~eh & Carry Grocery, Inc. to r ecover damages for her injuri es . During 
the course of the trial plaintiff proved the foregoing facts" Hhereupon, 
the defendant proved thc t the floors of the store were swept clean every 
ev~ning after closin~ and every morning early, as a matter of routine, 
and that they were swept at other times when the manage r thought it 
necessary. The de fendant alro proved that the floors had been swept clean 
on the mornin~ the plaintiff slipped and fell. The jury returne d a verdict 
for the plaintiff anJ defendant made a motion to set aside the verdict 
and enter judgment for the defendant. 
How should tte Court rule on the motion to set aside the verdict and 
enter judgment for th e defendant? 
There was no evidence of TlP. gl igence on the p art of the store and the 
court should set aside the verdict and ente r final judeme nt for the defendant 
Rose would have the burden of showine; that the onion was a hazard and that • 
the defe ndant r easonably should have known about its ;'rcsence. The contention 
that the onion had been on the floor a long time i s based on its dar k color 
is mere ijP@CUi?<t1tm. Juries should not be allowed to speculate on such 
matters ••• 208 Va 913. 
TORTS fl~' a. Mafla Hetcalf was s tntck by a passenger bus operated by an employee of 
carefree Transportation Company. In an action by Meria t·Jetcalf against the 
Oampany to r ec over damages for pers onal injuries she proved the following 
facts: that plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk at the m rner of an 
intersection of two streets; that the bus, as it approached the intersection 
of the two streets• ran up .on the sidewalk at the corner of the intersection 
and struck the p1aintiff causing her to sustain a fracture of her right leg• 
a fracture of her left arm* and a compression fracture of a lumbar vertebra; 
and that the bus Has under defendantcs exclusive control. Uter proving the 
foregoing facts plaintiff rested her case, whereupon defendant moved the 
court to strike plaintiff¢s evidence and to enter summary judglnent for 
~~'tt ~~i~l1\i lSi\ ~l%iiiif:f had not proved any specific act of 
negligence on the part of defendant~ 
The court shotl.d overrule this motion. The facts of this case clearly 
present a situation under which the doctrine of resipsa loquitur applies. 
l·llten a vehicle, under exclusive control of the defendant, leaves a vehicular 
thoroughfare and enters upon a city sideHalk• a place set aside for pedes-
trians, any injury inflicted is clearly the fault of the plaintiff under 
res ipsa. The burden is thus upon the defendant Bus Company to present 
evidence showing that t~ere was no negligenff e on the pnrt of its agent. 
_!-90 Va 979 §. £'A.-U-~ .-.-# ~~· (-u-~ c~ ¥~· .. 
lr';'fl:..:~. h/; ~ {) 
9. An ~dictment was returned in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, 
Virginia, against Marrow Bone charging that he illegally practiced law 
before that Court. On motion of Bone this indictment was quashed and 
dismissed upon the ground that the offense charged was barred by the statute 
of limitations. Shortly after the indictment had been dismissed, Bone 
commenced an action in the Circuit Court of that County against Sam Barrister 
to recover damages for malicious prosecution. In his motion for judgment 
Bone charged that Barrister maliciously and without probable cause procured 
the indictment; that the ind ictrnen t had been dismissed as the offense 
was barred by the statute of limitetions; and th<'lt Bone had been seriously 
damaged in his reputation as a result of the procurement of the indictment. 
Barrister filed grounds of defense adr1itting that the offense chnrged was 
barred by the stDtute of limitations. lie did not r espond to the othe r 
avennents contained in the motion for jud@llent, but he did charge in his 
grounds of defense that the charge ro ntained in the indictment \vas true, 
and that Bone was guilty of illegally practicin~ ~. /t the trial of the 
case Bone offered evidence proving that Barrister procured the indictment 
and that Barrister had acted pursuant to a malicious intent on his pnrt 
to injure Bone. Bone testified in his own behalf and on cross-examiuation 
he admitted tl~t he did not have a license to prnctice law in Virginia, 
and that the dh .:1 rge contained in the indictment was true. \rlhen plaintiff 
rested his case defendant moved to strike his evidence and for summary 
judgment. 
How should the Court rule? 
The court should sustain defendnnt.afs motion and enter summary judglnent 
for him. The maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution rest on 
two conditions: (1) favorable termination of the case on the merits; and 
(2) lack of probable cause for the action to be brought. \olith these <D ndi: 
tions mandatory, proof of nctual guilt of the person accused is a canplete 
defense, even if the original prosecution h<1d ~en dis rr1issed. (193 Va 301) 
(b) The form of the pleading by plaintiff is bad. To state correctly a good cause 
of action for libel. slander or insulting words, the ~act words charged to have 
been used by the defendant must be alle ed. Because plaintiff failed to set out the 
exact words used by defendant, his motion is insufficient under Virginia.law. 
Furthermore plaintiff has not alleged special dama es, and such allegat1ons would ~ 
be necessa~ to sustain a caus ac 1on where no libel per se is involved. \"~ 
(173 Va.200). ~" 
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6.~~son, who owned a station wagon used for g7neral family purposes, was 
approached by an acquaintance, Benton, about mov~ng a bar cabinet from one part or 
town to another. Caldwell, a friend of Benton, overheard the discussion and stated 
that he had a stuffed gnu that he wanted to move. Allison suggested that if Caldwell 
would help move .the bar, then he would move the stuffed gnu. The next day the three 
men met and moved the bar, with each one having two drinks of whiskey from the well-
stocked bar. They then loaded Caldwell's gnu, and enroute to their destination, 
while Allison was driving in a line of traffic within the speed limit, his attention 
was attracted by Jane Mainesfeld, a well-proportioned young lady in a miniskirt, 
walking along the sidewalk and as they passed, Allison turned his head for about a 
second to gain a well-rounded view. When he looked back, he saw to his dismay that 
the traffic ahead had stopped and he crashed into the oar in front of him, causing 
the stuffsd gnu to topple on Caldwell and seriously injure him. 
Caldwell consults you as to his rights, if any, against Allison to recover for 
his personal injuries. How would you advise him? 
(TORTS) You should advise C that he has no rights as against A. The facts fail to 
establish a contract of hire or relation which would give to C a status other than 
that of a guest. No apparent benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, inured to A out of 
any part of the activities involved. A's undertaking to assist both Band C in 
what each wished to accomplish was solely a voluntary and neighborly gesture on his 
part, and without consideration. Thus, the Va. Guest Statute, 8-646.1, C could only 
recover from A if he can show gross negligence on the part of A. The facts show a 
momentary lack of attention, not gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard 
of C's safety. C has no right of action as against A.(l88 Va.207). 
7.~t~Zbeat was employed by Puritan as a clothing salesman working on a commission 
basis in Norfolk, Va. Deadbeat owed Strongarm a nine-~onth past-due indebtedness of 
$400, for which demand for payment repeatedly had been made. Deadbeat paid Strong-
arm, but through negligent mishandling of his records, Strongarm did not credit 
Deadbeat's account and subsequently wrote a letter to Puritan as followst 
~our employee Deadbeat has owed us $400 for almost a year and has consistently 
refused to pay the same. We know that you would take a dim view of an employee 
of yours acting in this way toward a creditor and feel that if you explain to 
him his responsibilities and liabilities and possible effects of the same upon 
himself, he would be induced to make payment to us." 
(c.;,. 
Puritan showed Deadbeat the letter and angrily lectured him, but upon being 
assured that the debt had been paid, Puritan told Deadbeat not to let it happe 
again and sent him back to work. n 
Deadbeat brought an action at law against Strongarm by a motion for judgment a d 
the paragraph of the motion for judgment stating his alleged cause of action w~sn 
as follows: 
"Str~ngarm did wrongfully, unlawfully and with malice write and publish to 
Pur1tan a letter which w:ongfully and mistakenly alleged that Deadbeat was 
ind~bted to S~ongarm,.w1th intent to force payment which was not due and/or 
to 1nduce Pur1tan to d1scharge Deadbeat, all to the humiliation ridicule 
and embarrassment of the plaintiff, Deadbeat, for which he is e~titled to' 
compensation.u 
(a) Does plaintiff, Deadbeat, have a substantive cause of action on which he rna 
recover? y 
(b) Is the quoted paragraph of the motion sufficient as to form? 
(TORTS)(a) Plaintiff ha~ no substantive cause of action under Virginia law. As 
respects a charge of fa1lure to pay one's debts, without any imputation of insol 
a writing containing the mere statement that a person who is not a trader or a vency-: 
mer~hant, or engaged in any vocation wherein credit is necessary for the conduct of 
bus~ness, owes a debt and refuses to pay, or owes a debt which is long past d . 
not libelous per~ and does not render the author or publisher of such stat ue,~18 
libel without proof of special damages. Neither plaintiff's allegations nor :~env 
evidence show proof of any special damages which must in fact have been diff ed 
if plaintiff were to have a cause of action for libel under these circumstan~re (182 Va.512, 200 Va.572) es. 
~ 
8.~?ygirl invited Shyman to her home for a cozy dinner, during which she asked 
Shyman to fetch another bottle of champagne from the cellar. Upon descending to the 
dimly lighted basement and turning the corner of a stairway, Shyman's left leg was 
was impaled on the splintered end of a wooden board which Playgirl had left wedged 
in the side of the stairwell after her last karate practice session. Shyman ascer-
tained that Dr. Quackenbush was considered to be a competent and qualified physician 
and went to him for treatment of his leg wound, during the course of which, Dr. 
Quackenbush overlooked removing one of twelve minute splinters deeply imbedded in 
the leg, which, other consulting physicians agreed, would have been most difficult 
to detect even by the most careful examination. 
After Shyman recovered from the initial disability of the actual wounds, an in-
fection set in from the splinter which required treatment and caused a subsequent 
disability. After recovery from this and after the scars were well healed and 
though they were slightly unsightly only, Shyman went to Dr. Newskin, a plastic 
surgeon considered to be competent and qualified, for revision of the scars on his 
leg. During this operation, Dr. Newskin left a small sponge under the skin at one 
incision site, and though Shyman complained of pain, Dr. Newskin ignored the 
complaints and did nothing and left town for several weeks with the result that 
serious complications set in and Shyman was again disabled. 
Consulting physicians advised that the sponge could have been discovered at the 
time of closing the incision and an examination afterward would have also revealed 
the same under the skin. 
Shyman consults you as to his rights of recovery, if any, against Playgirl for: 
(l) the initial injury and disability, 
(2) the infection and second disability while under the treatment of Dr. 
Quackenbush, and 
(3) the third disability as the result of Dr. Newskin's treatment. 
(~RTS) (l) Playgirl is liable to . l~4 • . -Wh~le the general rule, which is f~laintiff for t?e.init1al injury and disability. 
to keeE his Prem~i in a saf d llpwed in Virg1n1a, says a host is under no duty t~ere are e~ptioos where a ~a~ ;:~;:a~l e condi ti o.n_tar___th_ELJ!§_e_ of_ a licensee, 
t on on the remises should real· 1 r has reason_t.cL knQ}LQf_ a dangerous _condi-plaintiff, knows pla1ntiff wou ~~: ~ i n unreasonable risk of to e~c1 se rilasonable eare to make taeJ1s~ve:r_ or rea.llEe t.he danger_, J!.lld fails to 
defendant can be held liable. The fa en -ti-on-scrf'e-or-te--wam ~a:i,rlt!ff, then 
this excep 10n to the generar rul cts of this case seem reasonably to fall under 
(2) Playgirl can also be held 1" e and be controlled by it.(207 Vao343). 
holds that if an injured person 1able for the second disability. The general rule 
treatment the law regards the auses or~inary-ear~n-sel~~i~g-a~hysician for 
act of ph ar. 0 ggravat
1on °~!he injury resulting from the negligeni 
the..-.origina-1 injury. It is so ~~liiiiTiedlat_e .ailcldirect-.dmrrage_s__wbich --flOl.r from 
reasonably have been anticipated Alecause the aggravation under these facts could 
Dr. Q were in fact negligent und;r t~' t~ere wou(ld be a question if the actions of 
(3) Playgirl not liable for actions ~se acts. 181 Va.222) 
N were more than the aggravation of anf Dr •. N. The subsequent negligent acts of Dr. 
to anticipate Dr. N would be 80 rossl orig1?al injury, since it was not reasonable in plaintiff, and then completel; d. Y negl1?ent as t? sew up a foreign substance 
constituted a separate, and inde en~~rega.:d h1s com?la1nts. The acts of Dr .. N 
not, under the law, be reasonabl; hel~tl~:~l~ff~;:~~§~n~::2~~).w~~P;!a~~ 
t ' 
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y fJ~lrlin worked for _the Universal Paper Co. which conducted a large operation in 
Virginia, employing several hundred men. Due to the negligence of Austin, a fellow 
employee, on September 16, 1967, Carlin was killed while performing his duties as a 
skip operator. You are consulted as to whether Carlin's administrator can maintain 
an aetion for damages for wrongful deat~. (&) Against Austin, and (b) againat Uniersal. How ought you to advise? 
(AGENCY,TORTS)The administrator cannot maintain an action for damages for wrongful 
death against either the negligent employee or the employer. Every employer and 
employee is conclusively presumed to have accepted the prosivions of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. An~ under the Act, the rights. az:d remedies granted ~o an employer 
respecting compensat1on on account of personal lnJury or death by acc1dent shall 
exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee or personal representative. 
Henee no wrongful death action may be maintained. (184 Va.96; 65-37; 65-20; 65-21; 
65-22) 
'7 s.tbecedent was killed when his ~utomobile slipped off a jack which he was using i: 
an attempt to change a tire, and his administrator sued the manufacturer of the 
jack for his wrongful death. At the trial it was proved that the accident might 
have happened either because of a structural defect in the jack or because of the 
failure of Decedent ~o nchock" the wheels_properly, and it .was impossible to say 
which caused the acc1dent. At the conclus1on of all the evldence the manufacturer 
moved the Court to strike the evidence. How ought the Court to rule on the motion? 
I....., -. .. 
(TOnTS) The Court should strike the evidence. The party who affirms actionable 
negligence must establ~sh it by proof sufficient to satis~y.reasonable ~d well 
balanced minds. The ev1dence must show more than a probablllty of a negl1gent act. 
Moreover, if the injury complained of may have resulted from one of two causes, for 
one of which the defendant is liable, but not for the other, the plaintiff cannot 
recover. Neither can he recover if it is just as probable that the damage was caused 
by the one as by the other.(l03 Va.64) 
